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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
infrequent suits of individuals. The rule of exemption was not adopted
with such institutions in mind. Neither was it contemplated that insurance
could be successfully used to preserve charitable funds from damage claims.
As times passes, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify the application
of the rule to any circumstances, and no justification whatever exists in
cases where insurance is carried. J. A. G., '31.
CONSTiTUTIONAL LAw-CouRTs-PowER OVER ADMISSIONS TO BAn.-An
applicant to the bar had passed the educational test, but the board of bar
examiners refused to grant him a certificate of good moral character. On
application, the Supreme Court admitted him to practice despite the failure
to obtain the required certificate, on the ground that it believed his character
to be good. Brydonjacc v. State Bar of California (Cal. 1929) 281 Pac.
1018. The court declared that its decision was not necessarily contrary to
the statute creating the board, but the real issue was as to the legislature's
power to regulate the bar.
Since attorneys are officers of the court, the power to admit applicants to
practice is judicial and not legislative. But decisions generally concede that
the legislature may, in the exercise of its police power, prescribe reasonable
rules and regulations for admission to the bar. 6 C. J. 571, 2. With this as
a basis, it has usually been held that compliance with statutory requirements
does not make the practice of law a matter of right and that courts may im-
pose additional requirements upon applicants. Olmsted's Case (1928) 292
Pa. 98, 140 Atl. 634; In Te Peters (1927) 221 App. Div. 607, 225 N. Y. S.
144, aff'd 250 N. Y. 595, 166 N. E. 337; In Te Platz (1913) 42 Utah 439, 132
Pac. 390. The only case which directly opposes this doctrine is In re Appli-
cants for License to Practice Law (1906) 143 N. C. 1, 55 S. E. 635, in which
two judges dissented.
The question raised by the principal case, however, is not whether courts
may impose additional requirements, but whether they may admit attorneys
to practice in spite of their failure to comply -with existing statutory re-
quirements. The only other case in which the question has been directly
raised is In Te Bowers (1918) 138 Tenn. 662, 200 S. W. 821, in which the
court stated: "The question for determination now is whether upon excep-
tions to the board's report, this court will go into evidence and determine for
itself contrary to the recommendations of the board that the applicant
should be admitted to practice. It seems to us that the mere statement of
the proposition is its own answer. . . The certificate of the board is the
only thing which the Legislature intended that we should consider, and when
the board refuses to make a certificate, or, as in this case, certifies that the
applicant is an unfit person to be admitted to the practice, that ends the
matter in the absence of allegation and proof of fraud, corruption, or op-
pression on the part of the board."
The police-power theory of the legislature's control over bar admissions
is that the legal profession can be regulated just as other professions and
businesses. But the legislature, under the police power, can regulate no
business, profession, or occupation unless a reasonable necessity exists. 6
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R. C. L. 218; People v. Ringe (1910) 197 N. Y. 143, 90 N. E. 451; Ex parte
Whitwell (1893) 98 Cal. 73, 32 Pac. 870; Toledo, Wabash & Western Rail-
wa*i Co. v. The City of Jacksonville (1873) 87 Ill. 37; State v. State Board
of Medical Examiners (1923) 209 Ala. 9, 95 So. 295; Ex parte Hall (1920)
50 Cal. App. 786, 195 Pac. 975. From this it may be concluded that while
the power of the courts over attorneys is continuous, the legislature may
regulate them only when a necessity for such regulation exists. In the
principal case it might well have been argued that since the court had taken
the particular case under its special consideration there was no necessity, in
that case, for application of the legislative enactment. The court placed
its decision on the ground that the board of bar examiners was a preliminary
fact-finding body whose decision was in no way binding in a subsequent
hearing by the court, which has plenary power to admit. Either mode of
reasoning leads to the same result.
Aside from the police power, it may be argued that the legislature may
control bar admissions consistently with its general legislative power ex-
emplified in the enactment of rules of evidence and procedure. This con-
sistency, however, is more apparent than real, since the legislative power
over such elements of the judicial process as evidential and procedural rules
has never been questioned and is imbedded in our constitutional system,
while its powers over bar admissions has always been clouded in doubt. In
any event, decisions rely rather on the police power theory; and it is now
settled beyond doubt that the courts and not the legislature have funda-
mental rights of control over attorneys. See (1929) 15 ST. LouIs L. REV. 96.
The decision in the principal case is open to one serious objection; as a
practical matter it would be unwise to allow the courts to be burdened by
appeals of disappointed applicants. This consideration seems to have in-
fluenced the decision in In re Bowers, above. But all difficulty may easily
be eliminated by adopting as rules of court all regulations over the bar which
the courts deem advisable. This has already been done by the Supreme
Court of the United States and by those of a few states. Indeed, if the
courts wish to preserve their inherent power over attorneys, this step seems
essential. A complete set of court rules regulating bar admissions would
make all statutes on the subject unnecessary, and it would seem to follow
logically that the legislature would lose all control over the legal profession
until a positive necessity arose for further regulation. J. A. G., '31.
CORPORATIONS-DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY-PERSONAL COR-
PORATIONS.-In the case of Fidelity Trust Co. v. Service Laundry Co.
(Tenn. 1929) 22 S. W. (2d) 6, the will of the testatrix provided that any in-
debtedness upon the part of any of her nephews owing to her should be can-
celled. One of the nephews was the sole owner of the stock of the Service
Laundry Co., which corporation was indebted to the testatrix on a promis-
sory note executed by the nephew, L. E. Williams, as president of the com-
pany. Held, that the bequest of the testatrix cancelled the debt owing from
the corporation to the estate. This case raises the perplexing problem
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss3/13
